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While the poor quality of governance is widely accepted as a main factor hampering 
economic development in Central Asia, one of the main ways to solve this problem is often 
connected with changing the allocation of authorities, shifting them to the supranational 
(regional integration) or subnational (decentralization) levels. Both aspects have been widely 
discussed, but the progress remains extremely limited. This paper claims however, that in 
spite of deficit of formal institutions, informal decentralization and regional integration have 
been important factors with a profound impact on economic and social development of 
Central Asia. However, the impact of informal shifts of authority on institutional development 
is not unambiguous.    
 
 
The paper was written within the framework of the project “Emerging Market Economies in 
Central Asia: The Role of Institutional Complementarities in Reform Process”. The paper was 
presented at the conference of the project in September 2008 in Goettingen. The author thanks 
the participants for helpful discussion. 
1. Introduction 
 The problem of regional integration and decentralization in Central Asia is relevant at 
least from two points of view. From the positive perspective, economic and political transition 
is hardly limited to the clear structure of a nation-state. It is much more often resulting into 
shifts of authority and economic relations both between and within states (Ananyin, 2005). 
Regional economic integration and political, administrative and fiscal decentralization 
represent just individual aspects of these changes. Hence, these shifts may become a crucial 
factor explaining the outcomes of economic development, and are worth studying. From the 
normative perspective, both decentralization and international economic integration are often 
claimed to be able to act as an important trigger to overcome the problems of institutional 
quality in the region. In the post-Soviet world territorial decentralization of power and 
devolution of services to municipal self-governance level are often considered as key 
elements of successful transformation. Though the issue of the regional integration is 
perceived differently for different regions of the former Soviet Union, the overall consensus is 
that increasing regional cooperation could be helpful for Central Asia from the point of view 
of economic development and overcoming common problems (Gleason, 2001).  
However, in spite of multitude of projects and initiatives in both fields, both regional 
integration and decentralization remain mostly a vague collection of “ink on paper”. All 
countries of the region are highly centralized and do not allow for even limited authority of 
subnational jurisdictions. Multilateral integration and cooperation virtually does not exist in 
spite of a multitude of projects in this area. Though, economic opening up may be achieved 
through unilateral actions, which do not require cooperation, it is however not what one 
observes in Central Asia: all countries of the region implemented at least some protectionist 
measures at certain points of time. 
 This paper, however, aims to consider a different perspective on both problems. It 
claims that in spite of obvious weakness of the formal decentralization and regional 
integration, informal decentralization and regional integration become crucial elements of 
regional development. From the point of view of decentralization, it is well known that the 
formal distribution of authorities among levels of government does not necessarily represent 
the real equilibrium, developed through the interaction of bargaining power (Taylor, 2007). 
The informal decentralization represents a specific case of authority migration through 
encroachment, shirking, burden-shifting and other forms of opportunistic behavior (Bednar, 
2004). Regional governments are often able to achieve a higher degree of autonomy than 
specified in the formal constitution; on the other hand, China gives an example when a formal 
decentralization is counteracted by informal centralization through control over appointment 
of regional party secretaries (Landry, 2004; Sheng, 2007). From the point of view of the 
international integration, the areas of relatively less effective regionalism could happen to be 
quite successful in terms of regionalization, i.e. interaction of economic and political actors 
beyond the formal intergovernmental cooperation across national borders. Main elements of 
the regionalization usually include stable trade networks, cross-border investments linking the 
countries through international chains of production and migration. The well-known case of 
“informal integration” is South East Asia, where foreign direct investments of Japanese 
corporations and cross-border Chinese ethnic business networks effectively substitute for lack 
of formal international integration (Peng, 2000; Kawai, 2005). In Africa cross-border trading 
networks play a similar role: while the official intraregional trade is estimated at the level of 
6% of the overall foreign trade of the countries in the region, the informal trade flows not 
captured by statistics could reach the level of 30-50% (Meager, 1997). Similar processes are 
observed in Southern Asia, although they seem to be less developed (Taneja, 2001; Rafi 
Khan, 2007).  
The paper is therefore organized as follows. The second and the third sections deal 
with the informal decentralization and regionalization (two concepts which are unfortunately 
not entirely symmetric). The fourth section sums up potential institutional implications of 
both informal processes. The fifth section looks at the interaction of formal and informal 
changes in spatial governance organization. Finally, the last section concludes. The first two 
sections are mostly descriptive: my aim is basically to focus on the existence of certain 
phenomena, often neglected in the analysis but potentially important for the regional 
development. The further sections are deductive: basically, they propose a set of hypotheses 
linking the observed phenomena (informal integration and informal decentralization) with 
each other and with institutional development. I most certainly understand that this approach 
is not sufficient to prove the causal claims; but it may at least give some ideas for further 
research.  
 
2. Informal decentralization   
2.1. Post-Soviet experience of informal decentralization 
The problem of substantial differences between de-facto and de-jure decentralization 
is not unique for Central Asia and is present in most post-Soviet countries. In the Soviet 
Union relations between different tiers of governance were threefold. First, the country was 
officially organized as a multi-level asymmetric federation. Secondly, the formal 
decentralization was in fact part of a strictly hierarchical political system with absolute 
dominance of the central government; the Soviet Union thus was a “super-unitary” state. 
However, thirdly, the Soviet hierarchy evolved from the 1950s on into a system of multi-level 
bargaining between different power centers with informal property rights over their assets and 
territories, often exchanging the formal loyalty for quasi-autonomy (typical for the Southern 
republics of the Soviet Union). This system of informal bargaining is often referred to as the 
“administrative market” (Kordonskiy, 1995).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the power balance in the administrative 
market. Formally, most post-Soviet de-jure allowed different forms of administrative, but not 
political decentralization, establishing a clear hierarchy between the central and the regional 
authority (with the only exception of Russia as a formally federal country, as well as Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia with autonomous territories). Even Russia established in 1994 a highly 
centralized structure of fiscal federalism with relatively limited authority of the regions; in 
fact, differences between de-jure federal Russia and de-jure unitary Ukraine, Belarus or 
Kazakhstan are smaller than one would expect, though present (Dabla-Norris, 2000; Lavrov, 
2004). However, the development of de-facto decentralization varied more significantly. 
While several new independent states were too small to experience any significant 
decentralization, faced too strong external challenges (like Armenia) or developed a highly 
autocratic political system even exceeding that of the late Soviet period (like Turkmenistan), 
several larger republics with relatively weak central government experienced the de facto 
devolution: the regional governments were able to seize significant power and became 
influential players. The classical example is that of the Russian Federation with its 
asymmetric federalism of the 1990s: even after establishment of the formal rules of a highly 
centralized federation in 1994 regional governments continued gaining independence through 
the quasi-constitutional system of power sharing treaties and unilateral actions like strategic 
tax collection and “war of laws” (Litwak, 2002; Libman and Feld, 2008). In Ukraine regional 
governments led by the presidents of regional councils (oblastnoi sovet) became influential 
players in the political system, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea followed the Russian 
path of unilateral devolution (Turovskiy, 1999); the resulting “decentralized influence over 
revenue policy” seemed to be much higher than formal structures would suggest (Way, 2002).  
However, the informal nature of the decentralization made it vulnerable to power 
shifts (Bahry, 2003); the evolution of the post-Soviet regimes, on the other hand, dictated the 
consolidation of power on the central level (Furman, 2007). Hence, most post-Soviet 
countries which became informally decentralized in the 1990s, switched to increasing 
centralization when the regional semi-autocracies managed to gain power. In Russia the 
centralization stage replaced informal decentralization in the 1990s after the power shift from 
Yeltsin to Putin; nevertheless, even the first term of Putin (2000-2004) and, according to 
certain claims, the first wave of gubernatorial appointments at the beginning of the second 
term, were characterized by relatively high informal autonomy of regional governments and 
persistent informal decentralization (cf. Chebankova, 2008). In Ukraine the shift to 
centralization occurred earlier under the administration of Kuchma based on successful 
manipulation of regional elites, which, however, also tolerated informal autonomy of the 
regions for a relatively long period of time (Turovskiy, 1999; Sasse, 2001). Since the Ukraine, 
unlike Russia, is economically decentralized (in spite of economic dependence of individual 
regions from the center), the regions still continue playing an important role in the political 
processes in the country, and the political struggles after the Orange Revolution lead to 
repeated discussion of the federalization idea. Nevertheless, the general logic of 
predominance of informal decentralization depending upon the power balance at the central 
level remains valid: the informality of decentralization makes it sustainable only if the central 
authority is weak. 
The informality of decentralization fits quite well in the model of semi-authoritarian 
hybrid regimes and the “hostage taking” as an instrument of control typical for many post-
Soviet countries. In fact, the attempts of the central government to establish control over 
secessionist territories by force in the former Soviet Union failed (and resulted into 
emergence of non-recognized states), while the temporary retreat and acceptance of informal 
decentralization allowed the re-centralization in the future (Ukraine does not fit this pattern, 
but its current political system is also quite different from the post-Soviet standard).1 The 
mechanism of is very similar to that of control over private business: since decentralization is 
informal, it may be removed by applying perfectly legal instruments; their selective 
application may be used as an instrument of control over regional elites. As the previous 
section claimed, semi-authoritarian regimes have an extremely negative impact on public 
administration. It will be shown that the same is true for the devolution in semi-authoritarian 
environment. 
 
2.2. Specifics of Central Asia 
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 The only exception is the Chechen Republic, where Russia actually enforce the regime of very high informal 
autonomy. 
 The development of Central Asian countries to certain extend reflects these general 
trends, but there are important differences between countries. Melvin (2001) claims that in the 
Central Asian countries sub-national units inherited substantial de-facto autonomy though 
patron-client relations and economic networks, which could be used in the bargaining process. 
Kazakhstan, as the largest country of the region, resembles the pattern of the informal 
decentralization-recentralization dynamics of Russia and Ukraine pretty closely. In the first 
half of the 1990s the country experienced a severe economic crisis, leading the regional 
governors to develop their own policies partly deviating from the central ones. Moreover, the 
concentration of FDI inflow in the oil-rich Western part of the country also increased the 
bargaining power of local elites, able to influence the appointment of governors (akims). The 
economically successful regions received a higher portion of tax revenue generated from their 
territory. The results and the mechanisms of informal decentralization in Kazakhstan were 
very similar to those observed in Russia: capture of local tax authorities, tax exemptions for 
companies for donations and inconsistent application of central regulations. Hence, the 
informal decentralization thrived in Kazakhstan as well as in other large countries of the CIS. 
The main difference was probably the higher concern of the central government for secession 
threats of the Northern territories with a significant share of the ethnically Russian population 
and traditional economic ties to Siberia. In fact, the potential of internal separatism belongs to 
the factors making Kazakhstan supportive of the post-Soviet integration. 
 Since 1999 economic boom and completion of the power concentration at the central 
level made the policy of recentralization possible. As in Ukraine, the formal appointment of 
akims by the central government made the personnel selection schemes the main instrument 
of recentralization: former members of the central government were appointed as akims. 
Furthermore, the central government re-established control over oil and gas resources of the 
regions through the newly established KazMunaiGas. Territorial shifts of regional borders and 
removal of the capital from the Southern Almaty to Astana in the center of the country also 
contributed to the reduction of political de-facto autonomy of governors (Cummings, 2000;  
Melvin, 2001; Jones Luong, 2004; Paarmann, 2007). Increasing transfers from the center 
increase the dependence of regions from the center (Ufer and Troschke, 2006). Interestingly 
enough, success of de-facto re-centralization seems to support the desire of the central 
government to experiment with different forms of self-governance at the regional level. In 
2001 president Nazarbaev allowed the pilot elections of heads of rural administrations (a 
practice resembling the rural elections in China, see Thurston, 1998); however, the 
experiment was ceased in 2003 and was heavily criticized for non-democratic practices and 
limited authorities of newly elected officials. As mentioned, local governments still own 
about 80% of public enterprises, but the authorities are not clearly separated and the degree of 
autonomy is in fact very limited (Gutovnik, 2006). Thus modern Kazakhstan turned into a de-
facto and de-jure highly centralized political entity. 
Other countries do not really follow the devolution-recentralization dynamics like 
Kazakhstan. The regime of Akaev in the Kyrgyz Republic with the strong division between 
the northern and the southern part basically focused on incorporation of regional elites and 
increasing interdependence of regional and central government (Melvin, 2001). Political 
turbulences in the second half of the 2000s gave rise to development of informal devolution. 
In Tajikistan civil war obviously led to the vacuum of power; the positions of local 
authorities differed substantially during the civil war; nevertheless, there has been a strong 
convergence trend after 1997 (Olimov and Olimova, 2001). Currently the increasing political 
stability seems to support the re-centralization trend, limiting the power of regional elites: so, 
one may say, the country also experienced the “decentralization-recentralization” cycle, but in 
the extreme form of the civil war. In Uzbekistan, unlike Kyrgyz Republic, the regime of 
Karimov was able to restrict power of local networks and thus develop a highly centralized 
political system based on omnipresent central control (Melvin, 2001). Turkmenistan is 
probably the most centralized country in the region; governors are dismissed in short intervals 
and without any reasonable explanation (Leschenko and Troschke, 2006) – once again, due to 
the very high power concentration at the central level. 
There is, however, yet another perspective on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan, discussed by Jones Luong (2000). Regardless of the degree of de-facto 
decentralization she documents the strong development of regional interests and political 
identities in the political and economic elites, which manifest themselves in the decision-
making at the central level.2 A similar concept in the theory of decentralization is the 
“constitutional decentralization”, i.e. the ability of regions to influence national decisions; in 
the case of the Central Asian countries it is obviously necessary to refer to an “informal 
constitution” as system of rules governing relations within the elite as the basic concept. The 
rise of regional political identities seems to be stronger than the development of tribal and 
local interests as an unexpected result of the Soviet heritage. Regional political interests are 
very important for the Kyrgyzstan with its model of “incorporation” of regional elites. The 
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 These practices resemble the importance of regional interests in Ukraine, where the centralization is also often 
perceived as collusion of the center with individual regions (Solnick, 2002) and the current politics is strongly 
divided along regional lines, although the mechanism of formation of regional interests may be different.  
civil war in Tajikistan can be perceived as war between regions (Olcott, 2005: 146). It is 
questionable whether the “public manifestations” of regional political identities survived the 
consolidation of power in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the mid-2000s. However, from this 
point of view one could actually claim, that the very nature of any central-level politics in 
Central Asia is to a certain extend related to the competition of regional clans (Starr, 2006); 
therefore even the re-centralization can be viewed as a success of a particular regional 
interest.3 
 
3. Informal regional integration 
3.1. Post-Soviet experience of informal integration 
Once again, informality of regional integration is not a specific feature of Central Asia 
and is present in the post-Soviet world in general. There are good reasons to claim, that, in 
spite of weak formal integration (which is currently falling apart) the region currently exhibits 
a substantial degree of the bottom-up integration. Basically, there are four factors contributing 
to this process. First, Vahtra (2005), Crane et al. (2005), Libman and Kheyfets (2006) and 
Kuznetsov (2007) show, that since early 2000s Russian corporations have been increasingly 
present in the post-Soviet countries through takeovers, joint ventures and – recently – 
greenfield investments. The investment expansion of Russian business is only partly 
registered by official statistics, since informal channels and offshore schemes are actively 
employed. Traditionally three main sectors of expansion are oil and gas, metals and mining 
and telecom, although currently a much larger diversification is observed. Second, post-Soviet 
countries are closely linked by migration flows: once again, the main destination for the labor 
migration is still Russia (Tyuryukanova, 2005; Ivakhnyuk, 2006). Third, the post-Soviet space 
is still connected through a unity of infrastructure, e.g. in railroad and power utilities sectors, 
created in the Soviet times. Finally, there is still a significant (though permanently declining) 
degree of social integration in the post-Soviet world, manifesting itself in interpersonal 
networks and, above all, Russian as lingua franca for communication (Nasledie Evrazii, 
2007). Hence, the regionalization in the post-Soviet space seems to be driven partly by the 
Soviet heritage (which may happen to be a “disappearing reality”), and partly by the logic of 
regionalization common for a typical geographical strategy of emerging multinationals 
(Davidson, 1980, Bell and Pennings, 1996). The post-Soviet regionalization seems to be 
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 The success of particular regions in this form of “horizontal” competition may, nevertheless, just form a step 
towards formation of a more traditional “vertical” model of interaction between the center and the regions, as it 
happened e.g. in the early Argentina (Gibson and Faletti, 2004). 
extremely asymmetric and clearly centered around Russia as the key market and key source of 
FDI in the region. Interestingly enough, there is no evidence of trade regionalization in the 
CIS (unlike, e.g., Africa, where informal integration is basically trade-driven), what can be 
attributed to the specifics of industrial structure of post-Soviet economies, where (mostly 
global) trade in commodities dominates the trade structure. Nevertheless, after significant 
decline of the 1990s the share of intraregional trade in the CIS reached a stable level; there is 
also evidence that the intraregional trade is still “too high” as opposed to gravity models 
predictions (Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2001; Djankov, Freund, 2002, 2002a; Elborg-Voytek, 2003, 
de Sousa and Lamotte, 2007).4 
From the point of view of this asymmetry regionalization in Central Asia seems to be 
a complex phenomenon. Theoretically, extraregional actors (like Russian corporations) could 
act as a driving force in the regionalization process. For example, in East Asia Japanese and 
(partly) U.S. multinationals seem to contribute to the development of informal regional 
structures (Dobson and Yue, 1997). However, it requires two additional conditions: first, 
companies are present in several countries of the region, and second, their businesses are 
linked to each other. To our knowledge, there are extremely few areas where both conditions 
are satisfied. Two fields where Russian FDI could potentially increase the degree of regional 
interdependence in the Central Asia are telecommunications and power utilities. Currently, 
the “Big Three” Russian mobile service providers are present in all five countries of the 
region (VimpelCom/Altimo in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, MTS in 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and Megafon in Kyrgyz 
Republic) and have already been engaged in tough competition for the most attractive assets. 
In the power utilities the major player is the state-owned RAO UES (currently its successor 
Inter RAO UES, controlling foreign assets of the former power monopoly), which is present 
in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as well as potentially in Kyrgyz Republic. Given the fact that 
the energy systems of the post-Soviet countries are still intervened, common actors in energy 
sectors can significantly contribute to regionalization. However, one should be aware of the 
fact that the energy trade in the post-Soviet space decreased in the last few years, and that the 
modes of organization of power utilities in individual Central Asian countries differ 
substantially.  A third field where Russian extraregional actors could potentially become 
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 It means that the counterfactual trade between the countries of the region estimated according to the size of 
their GDP and geographical distance is lower, than the actual trade flows. This, however, still does not imply 
that the intraregional trade is dominant in the trade structure. 
agents of regionalization is oil and gas; however, currently the presence of Russian 
corporations in these sectors is quite limited (although growing).  
Finally, regionalization through external actors - like in the “Greater China” area - is 
sometimes explained by the “intermediary function” accepted by certain regions and countries 
“canalizing” foreign investments and trade in the region (Breslin, 2004). However, developed 
bilateral ties between Russia and post-Soviet countries make the use of these “intermediaries” 
less important. The situation is not unambiguously clear (Kuz’min, 2007): Russian investors 
are probably not as close to Kyrgyzstan, as those from Kazakhstan, but the “distance” is still 
relatively small. However, as we will show bellow, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan seem to 
develop deep economic relations, which are not present elsewhere; in Tajikistan Russian 
investors are more important, than those from Kazakhstan. One could of course speculate as 
whether increasing presence of Chinese investors will contribute to establishment of the “gate 
regions” to support regionalization through external forces, but the outcome is yet to be seen. 
 
3.2. Foreign direct investments  
A more interesting question is whether one could expect any regionalization driven by 
the intraregional actors. It is clearly not the case in other regions of the CIS (for example, 
there is only vague evidence of some Ukrainian investment activity in Moldova – in 
particular, in Transdniestria, and of Azerbaijan – in Georgia). However, Central Asia is quite 
different, mostly because of the activity of private and semi-private businesses from 
Kazakhstan, which actively explore the Central Asian countries. Though main direction of 
investments for Kazakhstan is still Russia, it is increasingly present in the Central Asian 
region. As of September 30, 2007 Kyrgyz Republic ranks 13 in the overall outward 
investments of Kazakhstan with about 1.3% of total foreign investments of the country (US$ 
481 mln., including US$ 240 mln. FDI). Uzbekistan ranks 20 with US$ 199 mln. (FDI: US$ 
109 mln.), and Tajikistan ranks 21 with US$ 188 mln. (FDI: US$ 24 mln.). Hence, the 
countries seem to be of minor importance for the outward investment activity of Kazakhstan, 
with Russia, US, UK and British Virgin Islands (BVI) being the main targets for outward 
investments. However, one should take into account, that the Central Asian economies are 
relatively small, and hence even limited investment activity of Kazakhstan can become 
crucially important. Indeed, according to the investment statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan is currently the dominant source of FDI for Kyrgyzstan, accounting for about 
50% of the total investment inflow (see Figure 1). Unfortunately, we do not have data on the 
FDI structure for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, applying the Kazakhstan data on FDI 
and total investments and national data from the balance of payment, one could establish, that 
for Q1-Q3 2007 Kazakhstan accounted for about 21% of total investments and about 4% of 
FDI inflow in the economy of Tajikistan (with Russia being the main investor accounting for 
about 40% of capital inflow).5  One should, however, be aware of the presence of indirect 
investment channels (e.g. via the BVI investments), which have not been captured by the 
statistics above. 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of Kazakhstan in the FDI inflow to Kyrgyz Republic 
Source: governmental statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic 
The low quality of statistical data makes the discussion of case studies of investment 
activity in the region necessary.6 In what follows we list the main investment projects of 
Kazakhstan in other countries of the region. Most projects we are aware of are implemented 
in Kyrgyz Republic; it could represent the quality of data bias, however, from our point of 
view, reflects the true predominance of Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan connection in the 
regionalization processes in Central Asia. 
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 Surely, this indicator is extremely questionable. It is well known that direct comparison of outward and inward 
investment flows data from different statistical authorities of the CIS yields substantially different results 
(Vahtra, 2005); moreover, one faces the challenge of separating balance of payment statistics and methodology 
of statistical authorities, which also happen to be different. 
6
 The FDI data from the developing countries is generally very bad; it is also true for the post-Soviet space 
because of huge discrepancy in statistics of individual governments and role of offshors (see Libman and 
Kheyfets, 2006, for a detailed discussion); a specific problem is that the quality of data is really varying over 
time, making time series comparison problematic.  
While distinguishing among the areas of FDI activity of Kazakhstan in the region, one 
should point out the banking sector. Successful economic reforms fostering market discipline 
and high standards allowed Kazakhstan to establish a well-functioning banking sector 
outperforming that of most other CIS countries (including, to a certain extend, Russia), 
allowing the banking sector to pursue an active expansion strategy abroad. Currently the main 
holdings of the banks of Kazakhstan in Central Asia include Nacional’nyi Eksportno-
Importnyi Bank (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by TuranAlem (originally purchased by 
Temirbank), Kazkommerzbank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) and Kazkommerzbank 
Tajikistan (Tajikistan) owned by Kazkommerz, ATF Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) 
owned by ATF Bank, FinanceCreditBank (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by the Seimar Alliance 
Financial Corporation and Khalyk Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by 
Kazakhstan People’s Bank. Investments from Kazakhstan account for about 30% of the 
capital of the banking system of Kyrgyzstan being the sole major foreign investor (Abalkina, 
2007:43), and the share of the banks controlled by Kazakh banks may reach 50% of the 
market for banking services (Kuz’min, 2007). Nevertheless, the presence of the banks of 
Kazakhstan in other countries of Central Asia seems to be fairly limited. The state-owned 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan has a representative office in Uzbekistan. 
 There are several other sectors where investors from Kazakhstan achieved relative 
success. In Kyrgyz Republic one should definitively mention the tourist industry, in particular 
the recreation facilities in the Issyk-Kul region (UNDP, 2006:28). The data regarding this 
sector is fragmentary at best; however, the number of objects controlled by Kazakhstan could 
be significant. The most well-known deal is the agreement to pass four facilities to 
Kazakhstan signed in 2001 and ratified in 2008. Nevertheless, it probably covers only the top 
of the iceberg. In March 2008 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic announced its plan to 
construct a new road connecting Almaty and Cholpon-Ata at Issyk-Kul, which, however, is 
still very far from implementation. For sure a clear advantage is the geographic proximity of 
the region to Almaty, increasing the potential market for the tourist services for customers 
from Kazakhstan. 
Further sectors of the investments from Kazakhstan include mining, construction and 
media industries, as well as real estate. In Kyrgyz Republic Kazakh companies control the 
Kant Cement and Slate Plant, maize syrup plant, two concrete plants, Tokmok Brick Plant, 
Kadamjai Stibium Plant, Tokmok Wool Processing Plant, Kyrgyzenergoremont in Bishkek, 
and participate in the development of gold deposits at Jeruy (Visor Holding) and Taldy Bulak 
(Sammergold). In Tajikistan KazInvestMineral acquired the Adrasman mining complex in 
2006 for US$ 3.2 mln. In the field of gas supply Kazakhstan’s state owned KazTransGaz and 
Kyrgyz Kyrgyzgaz established a joint stock company KyrKazGaz in 2004 to operate the gas 
pipelines to the North of Kyrgyzstan and the South of Kazakhstan. As in the CIS in general, 
the dominant instrument is still acquisition of existing assets, though there is increasing 
presence of greenfield investments (like the recently initiated project of a 
ferrosilicoaluminium plant in Tash-Kumar (Kyrgyz Republic) for US$ 100 mln.) Finally, 
Kazakhstan seems to be extremely interested in power utilities in Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan (in January 2008 Kazakhstan declared its plans to participate in the reconstruction 
of the Kambarada Power Plant in Kyrgyzstan, and in February – in the reconstruction of the 
Rogun Power Plant in Tajikistan); however, any perspectives in this field are still vague, 
especially given active position of Russian RAO UES in the area. The investment activity 
seems to be driven by both relatively cheap labor (as opposed to Kazakhstan) and access to 
natural resources. Access to markets seems to be less important in this sector (unlike banking 
services).  
The opposite direction of investments from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
Republic to Kazakhstan seems to be insignificant. In the first 9 months of 2007 Uzbekistan 
accounted for about 0.004% of total FDI inflow to Kazakhstan (or 11% from the CIS),7 and 
Kyrgyz Republic for .008% (or about 22% from the CIS). There is no data on investment 
activity of Tajikistan, as well as cross-border investments in Central Asia beyond Kazakhstan. 
To conclude, it looks like the Central Asian regionalization is as asymmetric, as the 
regionalization process in the CIS in general, with Kazakhstan as the main source of outward 
investments and Kyrgyz Republic as the main recipient of FDI. In Tajikistan investments 
from Kazakhstan are important but less active, than those of Russia (in the Kyrgyz Republic 
the situation is exactly the opposite). Uzbekistan and (especially) Turkmenistan are much less 
active in the development of intraregional investment ties.  
 
3.3. Interregional trade 
In case of the intraregional trade the situation is similar to the CIS in general. Regional 
concentration of exports is characteristic to a certain extend for the Kyrgyz Republic mostly 
because of its close economic ties to Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
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 There are currently 96 enterprises with Kazakh investments functioning in Uzbekistan, including trade, 
construction, light industry, metals and food industry, and 715 small and medium enterprises with Uzbek 
investments in Kazakhstan, including trade, manufacturing, food industry, construction materials, glass, services 
and real estate operations (RIA Novosti, 2008, April 21). However, the quality of these data is very low and is 
hardly helpful for understanding the scope of international cooperation. 
Republic experience a certain degree of concentration of imports in the region. An additional 
factor potentially supporting the regionalization is that Central Asian countries share a 
number of common problems of infrastructure, in particular for energy trade and water 
supply, where their economies are closely linked to each other (Vinokurov, 2007). Even if the 
value of trade is small, its importance for the development is crucial. However, in spite of 
relatively low international trade, it seems likely that individual markets for consumer goods 
in the region are highly integrated. Grafe et al. (2005) show that the impact of border on price 
variation between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan is relatively small and 
practically equivalent to the intranational price variation between individual regions. It, 
however, does not imply that internal markets are integrated – only that the border effect for 
disintegration is less relevant. Therefore one could probably assume that the integration on the 
level of small business networks is much higher, than for commodities (which play the crucial 
role in determining the structure of trade statistics presented above).  Spechler (2000:7) claims 
that “with all the problems, informal trade among the Central Asian countries appears to be 
working reasonably well”. Informal trade seems to be important for countries like Tajikistan 
(Olimova et al., 2006) and even Turkmenistan in spite of strong trade restrictions (in 
particular across the border with Uzbekistan) (Badykova, 2006). One should however bear in 
mind that the emerging informal trade networks often span outside the Central Asian region 
over the whole Eurasian continent (Evers and Kaiser, 2000; Kaiser, 2002). 
Finally, the last issue to be considered is the labor migration in Central Asia. Once 
again, Kazakhstan acts partly as a regional leader attracting migrants (although Russia still 
remains the most important partner for the majority of the CIS countries from the point of 
view of migration – although there is an increasing evidence of competition between these 
two countries for the labor force). As in case of the FDI activity, increasing labor migration in 
Kazakhstan is also a relatively recent phenomenon, directly related to the economic success of 
the country in the last half decade. The main countries of origin for labor migration to 
Kazakhstan are Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic; the migration is partly driven by a 
relatively large ethnic Kazakh minority in Uzbekistan. Although Kazakhstan implements a 
policy of privileged ethnic immigration of the oralman (ethnic Kazakhs), there seems to be a 
significant flow of illegal labor migration exceeding the official migration. The number of 
labor migrants from Uzbekistan in Southern Kazakhstan (which seems to be the most 
attractive region for migration inflows) varies between 200,000 and 1 million; however, the 
any data is likely to be extremely biased and is to be considered with great caution. Some 
authors point out the existence of labor migration from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyz Republic, 
generating a remittance flow, but it seems to be relatively small (Mogilevsky, 2004:27). The 
migration flows have a heavy impact on both legal and illegal monetary flows of migrant 
remittances (Sadovskaya, 2006). In case of Tajikistan Russia remains the absolutely dominant 
country from the point of view of labor migration. Hence, for informal trade and migration 
the “microregionalization” involving selected regions and areas of the countries is probably 
relevant (however, one should not forget, that Southern Kazakhstan is not only geographically 
close to other countries of the region, but has also a relatively high level of economic 
development). 
 To conclude, one indeed can observe certain features of regionalization in Central 
Asia, but their impact is rather limited. There is some evidence of increasing presence of 
business groups from Kazakhstan in Kyrgyz Republic, which increased dramatically in the 
last years. The main driving force of regionalization is the banking sector; recently public 
structures (like KazTransGaz or Kazyna, currently developing a joint investment fund with 
Kyrgyzstan8) also became increasingly important. Even as opposed to the regionalization via 
FDI of Russian corporations in the CIS, which basically started in 2000, the regionalization 
via FDI of businesses from Kazakhstan in Central Asia is still a very recent phenomenon with 
only few years of experience and strongly depends on economic performance of Kazakhstan. 
However, a significant driving force for integration seems to be formed by informal networks 
interconnecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and only partly visible for 
official statistics. In this case regionalization is a much older phenomenon embedded in the 
traditional economic ties in the region. Moreover, it seems to be by far more developed, than 
in the CIS in general (with only few exceptions involving separatist regions like 
Transdniestria, Abkhazia, Southern Osetia and Nagorny Karabakh, which also rely on 
informal trade).  
Thus, Central Asia combines both “investment regionalization model” of South East 
Asia and the CIS (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic) and “informal trade regionalization 
model” of West Africa and South Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan). 
Given the significant size of the shadow economy in Kazakhstan (Schneider (2007) estimates 
it at 44.6% of official GDP for 2004/05), Kyrgyz Republic (40.6%) and Uzbekistan (35.4%), 
the role of informal trade can be significant, though diminishing given rapid economic growth 
in the region (especially in Kazakhstan). Less reliable estimates of shadow economy in 
Tajikistan exceed 60% of official GDP (Lenta.ru, 2007, June 27); however, the participation 
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 A similar fund was established with Tajikistan 
of the country in the regionalization processes is significantly smaller and the relative impact 
of Russia as an extraregional economic partner higher than for other countries. The role of 
Turkmenistan in the regionalization processes is negligibly small. 
 
4. Informal governance and institutions 
The main question to be discussed, however, is not just to establish the existence of 
informal regionalization and decentralization, but also to understand its institutional 
implications. Regionalization often occurs at the corners of development spectrum: it can 
become crucially important for economies at the low level of development, substituting for 
the deficit of the rule of law, but it can also follow from high development, with high 
governance capacity of non-governmental agents. In both cases effects of regionalization on 
institutions can differ. For example, in Medieval Europe merchant guilds effectively 
supported the de-facto integration of the economic space and overcame the low development 
of formal institutions (Greif, 2006), but also engaged in redistributive activities and market 
monopolization (Ogilvie, 2007). Decentralization, though often considered an attractive 
option to increase the quality of institutions, may have a negative effect on economic 
performance, depending upon the specific form and instruments of decentralization and the 
framework institutions determining the interplay of the center and the periphery in the 
particular decentralization scheme (Treisman, 2007). In a world of non- or semi-democratic 
governments and informal relations the effects of decentralization should be revisited. 
 
4.1. Decentralization  
Unfortunately, the experience so far has been dismal: there is no evidence that even 
limited decentralization and devolution of power to local municipal self-governing institutions 
improved the functioning of the public administration. It is possible to distinguish among four 
main factors making the experience of decentralization problematic: the informal nature of 
political property rights, interventions into economic autonomy of individuals and businesses, 
expansion of public authority through decentralization and decentralization with lacking 
intraregional infrastructure. In what follows I discuss these factors in greater detail. Of course, 
it does not mean that decentralization is unable to have a positive effect on the quality of 
public administration: it rather suggests that decentralization per se in the existing 
institutional environment is unable to generate new incentives for public officials.  
 As mentioned above, the predominance of informal practices and institutions 
constitutes an important problem for the public administration. The informal decentralization, 
by its nature implies the continuing use of informal instruments. It does not imply that the 
informal decentralization is unable to have positive economic effects on economic 
development: inefficient public service can be effectively substituted by informal practices of 
public officials. This is exactly the logic of the contested “grease the wheel” corruption 
theory: under certain circumstances, if the administration and legal system are highly 
inefficient, informal channels like corruption can help avoiding publicly created barriers and 
thus become growth-enhancing (Dreher, Gassebner, 2007). Competition between corrupt 
local governments in a decentralized environment can either establish a “race to the bottom” 
from the point of view of corruption like it is reported in India or increase the interest of 
governments in executing the “helping hand” policies for regional industry, as it may have 
happened with the TVE experience in China. Finally, the impact of inefficient administration 
on growth differs in different political regimes; Aidt et al. (2008) claim that corruption has a 
negative effect on growth in high accountability regime and no effect in low accountrability 
regime. There is certain evidence of growth-enhancing policies of local governors in 
Kazakhstan: in particular the example of the former governor of Semei Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov is worth mentioning. Nevertheless, it has nothing to do with better public 
administration; on the contrary, these practices just conserve the inefficiencies in the 
bureaucracy. Finally, one should not forget, that the informal decentralization was caused by 
the weakness of the central state: the re-centralization phase is therefore likely to include 
policy measures directed against more successful regional leaders (once again, Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov is a good example: the provincial governor and wealthy businessman was 
sentenced to prison). In fact, the very practices of informal decentralization, which per 
definition are semi-legal, give the central government the pressure instrument against local 
governments.  
 Decentralization, however, as already mentioned, does not necessarily mean growth-
enhancing policies. Given a particular framework of formal and informal institutions, it just 
creates additional possibilities for rent-seeking. In this case public administration remains 
bad. One of the factors determining the quality of public administration in semi-autocracies, 
as mentioned above, is the desire to use “hostage-taking” to control potential opposition. 
McMann (2006) studies this problem from the point of view of the “economic autonomy” 
reasoning. In order to actively participate in the political processes and to oppose the 
incumbent, citizens and businesses have to achieve certain degree of economic autonomy; the 
semi-democratic incumbent therefore tries to restrict the economic independence of its 
subjects. Regional governments are often quite successful in managing economic autonomy 
of individuals and small enterprises, which actually form the basis for the democracy: thus 
political systems in different regions become different. McMann (2006) documents the use of 
these instruments in less democratic regions of Kyrgyz Republic (as well as Russia). Hence, 
the negative effects of the political system on the quality of public administration may exist 
not only at the national, but also at the local level.  
 Moreover, decentralization may have a greater effect on the borders between state and 
society rather than on the internal organization of bureaucracy per se. Therefore it broadens 
the sphere of inefficiencies created by bad public administration. Noori (2006) provides 
evidence in favor of this statement studying the Mahalla Initiative in Uzbekistan. So far I have 
described Uzbekistan as probably the least decentralized country in the region due to its 
political regime. However, shortly after independence Uzbekistan started a program aiming to 
delegate administration of critical public services to local communities (mahalla) - an 
originally non-governmental institution, which received substantial public support (Mahalla 
Fund). Although the initiative was actively supported by the international NGOs due to both 
the secular status and the grassroots democracy organization of the mahalla, in the early 
2000s, Noori (2006) claims, that mahalla just turned into an additional coercive instrument of 
the state. On the one hand, the Mahalla Initiative merged the community-based institutions 
with the state, thus decreasing the ability of the society for self-organization – a practice 
similar to that of the Soviet government. On the other hand, there is evidence that mahalla did 
not improve the quality of the public services for the population.  
 Finally, many positive effects expected from decentralization are related to the 
opportunity of active factor flows across regional borders (for example, it is the necessary 
precondition of any interjurisdictional competition). This condition, which is straightforward 
in the developed world or even in Ukraine or European part of Russia, is very uncertain in 
Central Asia. It is particularly problematic for Kazakhstan: large dimensions of the country 
and poor quality of transportation (in particular, railroads) have been a severe problem for the 
economic development of the country (Ekspert Kazakhstan, 2007). Moreover, the countries of 
Central Asia – in particular Kazakhstan as the largest country, but also in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyz Republic – are characterized by severe territorial disparities, which seem to increase 
over time (UNDP, 2005; Ufer and Troschke, 2006).  In this environment interjurisdictional 
competition is likely to suffer from agglomeration effects, providing additional benefits to 
selected regions and reducing the pressure on their policies, thus creating a market failure in 
the market for institutions and economic policies. 
 
4.2. Integration  
The effects of regionalization can be both strengthening the market-enhancing 
institutions and conserving the inefficient institutional structure. However, these effects also 
differ for the “investment driven” regionalization and “informal trade” regionalization. From 
the point of view of the investment driven regionalization two arguments should be 
mentioned. First, investment driven regionalization (as well as developed labor migration) 
strengthens institutional competition, i.e. competition between countries for mobile factors of 
production by establishing legal environment and economic policies. Institutional competition 
is often considered to be an efficient tool of taming the Leviathanic rent-seeking government 
and of revealing the preferences for institutions through the evolutionary learning process 
(Vaubel, 2008). Second, multinationals are likely to act as channels of transmission of best 
practices and knowledge between countries, thus supporting the diffusion of efficient 
institutions. In a similar way, best practices can be important through the networks of labor 
migration. 
 Unfortunately, both positive effects are not unambiguous. On the one hand, 
institutional competition is not necessarily driven by demand for good institutions. In fact, the 
literature on the post-Soviet transition established a variety of factors leading to inefficient 
equlibria supported by the demand for bad institutions. Reasons for these “institutional traps” 
include redistribution effects, learning costs, deficit of trust, as well as interaction between 
formal and informal institutions. This is definitively related to the emergence and stability of 
the “clan capitalism” (Kosals, 2006) in the post-Soviet world. The main question is actually 
not whether demand for bad institutions really exists, but rather whether it is permanent (i.e. 
constitutes a stable equilibrium) or temporary (and after a certain period of development 
should be replaced by demand for good institutions). Havrylyshin (2007:17) refers to this 
discussion as “transition inevitable” and “transition frozen” school of thoughts and claims, 
that “the debate … will certainly go on for some time to come”. From the point of view of 
regionalization in the CIS space the results are ambiguous: both factors of demand for good 
institutions and demand for bad institutions seem to be present (Libman, 2007), see also the 
Appendix.  
 From the point of view of the Central Asian countries the problem is as ambiguous, as 
in the CIS in general. Actually, it receives an additional dimension given relatively high 
degree of political instability in several countries of the region (like Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan). It is clear that the increase of investments from Kazakhstan and Russia does not 
necessarily coincide with stronger demand for transparency and general rules in the Hayekian 
sense. In fact, demand for privileged relations with regional authorities may be more 
important, and the “threshold level” of demand for institutions necessary to enter the market 
for the post-Soviet companies is not so high anyway. Hence, foreign investments may well 
support inefficient equilibria. For sure they support the semi-authoritarian regimes in the 
countries of Central Asia, which, in turn, are one of the main factors of the existing low 
quality of governance (Libman, 2007a).9 However, the alternative to this support may be not 
market-enhancing reforms (like in the countries of the Western flank of the CIS), but chaos 
and disorder. The second channel of the impact of informal integration on economic 
institutions seems to be even more important in the region. In fact, in spite of its own 
institutional deficits, Kazakhstan can become an important source of “good practices” for the 
countries of the region. Once again, unlike the Western flank of the CIS, there are hardly any 
viable alternatives (like investments of multinationals from developed countries). 
Nevertheless, this transmission of good practices is per se limited by the quality of institutions 
in the country of origin of investments, making the very issue of institutional advancements 
crucially dependant from reforms in the leading country. Given the extremely short 
experience of the investment led regionalization in the region, it is still difficult to make any 
conclusions.10 
The effects of informal trade regionalization are also not unambiguous. As already 
mentioned, most forms of the informal regionalization appear in an environment of weak 
formal institutions; to a certain extend, they serve as an instrument of overcoming this 
problem. From this point of view informal trade networks serve as a natural instrument of 
establishing an order for economic transactions. However, in this case their advantages and 
disadvantages are similar to the general discussion on the role of informal economy: on the 
one hand, it overcomes the deficits of formal rules and makes economic transactions possible, 
but on the other hands, informal rules are less efficient (e.g. because of their personalized 
nature vis-à-vis formal abstract rules) and, more importantly, establish behavioral patterns 
preventing introduction of formal rules in the future. A possible strategy in compatible with 
the ideas of Hernando de Soto is to develop formal rules consistent with informal rules, but it 
is always a difficult task (also from the point of view of incentive-compatibility for political 
decision makers). Therefore the existence of informal trade regionalization may constitute a 
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 Moreover, as already noticed, strengthening these regimes can effectively result in a hold up of foreign assets 
and decline of regionalization in general. 
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 It is definitively necessary to differentiate between different groups of businesses and their strategies. The shift 
from demand for bad institutions to demand for good institutions is likely to depend upon these differences. 
Similar points are valid for Central Asia. Our paper therefore provides a rather simplified view, which is, 
however, helpful for the basic hypotheses development.  
constraint optimum in a given environment, but is able to become an obstacle for the 
development of efficient reforms in the future. 
 
5. Interplay of formal and informal institutions 
5.1. Formal and informal decentralization  
The processes of formal and informal institutional shifts are endogenous to each other. 
Therefore a final problem to be considered in this paper is the interaction between informal 
decentralization and regionalization and their formal counterparts, as well as decentralization 
and regional integration in general. As mentioned above, informal decentralization observed 
in several countries of the region throughout the 1990s, is likely to result from authority 
migration and reflect the relative bargaining power of the center and the regions. The most 
important issue of informal decentralization is that it may act as a “substitute” for formal 
bargaining for both regional and central elites. First, it may just be more convenient and 
“simple” option, given the decades of experience of informal bargaining in the region, and 
hence be preferred by elites just because of path dependence factors. Second, since opting-out 
(and secession) is not an option and the sides have to interact with each other, if there is high 
uncertainty about present and future bargaining power, informality allowing for re-negotiation 
of the contracts may be more attractive. Third, existence of “national-level” political interests 
and ambitions of regional leaders (e.g. in Kazakhstan in the 1990s) may as well prevent them 
from demanding more formal decentralization. In a world where regional interests are 
especially important for national-level politics (as claimed above) this factor is particularly 
important. Fourth, decentralization obviously reduces the ability of the central government to 
gain back the lost influence. As already mentioned, informal decentralization is very close to 
the general approach of semi-authoritarian regimes to maintain power monopoly in presence 
of limited resources. At the stage of informal re-centralization (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan) formal decentralization may become especially problematic, because it may 
trigger undesired informal power redistribution Therefore the experience of informal 
decentralization in the past will be limit the readiness of strong central governments to 
experiment with formal decentralization (or create extreme limits for these experiments).  
There is however a possibility that informal decentralization leads to demand for 
formal decentralization from the side of strong regions. Formal decentralization in a country 
with high informal decentralization is similar to gaining formal property rights in an economy 
where informal property rights dominate (notice, that since all countries are de-jure highly 
centralized, no protection of formal “property rights” of the center is necessary even if the 
central government is weak). As mentioned above, the problem of “spontaneous development 
of demand for property rights” is far from being resolved in the post-Soviet world. Similar 
logic may be attributed to regional governments. Therefore even strong regional leads may 
prefer low formal decentralization (because of the factors described above). Anyway, the 
current re-centralization phase in major countries of the region makes this question 
hypothetical, with the only exception of Kyrgyz Republic, where the involvement of regional 
elites in central politics seems to prevent them from demanding formal devolution.  
 
5.2. Formal and informal integration 
Once again, investment led and informal trade regionalization can have different 
influence on the regionalism in Central Asia. From the point of view of the former, the most 
often stated argument is that economic dominance of Kazakhstan based on the investment 
expansion of its corporations can become a factor supporting formal regionalism in its current 
form (once again, with Kazakhstan as the main actor). Regionalization can become an 
additional leverage mechanism. The increasing attention of the Kazakhstan government to the 
FDI activity in the Kyrgyz Republic confirms that at least these expectations are present at the 
level of the political decision makers. Nevertheless, international experience shows, that the 
asymmetric regionalization can have different impact on regionalism: while in Mexico the 
development of maquiladoras actually supported the formation of NAFTA, in the CIS 
significant presence of Russian investors in Ukraine did not support any formal integration 
between these two countries.  
Considering the link between investment-led regionalization and regionalism, one 
should not forget the potential importance of political institutions in the regional integration 
processes. As noted, most countries of the region are semi-authoritarian regimes, where 
governments use the design of economic institutions to restrict potential opposition. It is well 
known in the literature on international integration, that non-democracies are less likely to 
participate in the regional economic integration than democracies (Mansfield et al., 2002). In 
fact, that is what one can observe in Central Asia: in fact, the less democratic countries of the 
region (Turkmenistan and – to a lower extend – Uzbekistan) are also less likely to become 
part of integration agreements. The main problem is the issue of commitment: in a political 
system based on informal power balances it is extremely difficult to provide any commitment 
to an external actor, yet alone to give up part of the sovereignty (what is per definition implied 
by the regionalization). A question is of course whether regionalization can overcome these 
obstacles. Basically, there are two factors to be taken into consideration. First, regional 
cooperation can take form of the development of international hierarchies (Lake, 2007), and 
in this case is less dependent from the issue of democracy. An important aspect from this 
point of view is not just the existence of asymmetries, but the scope of asymmetries. Weak 
asymmetry can in fact be even quite dangerous for regionalism: it increases mistrust, but does 
not provide any instruments for leverage. In fact, the political elites in Kyrgyz Republic have 
been quite cautious with respect to any potential integration with Kazakhstan. However, high 
political instability is a clear factor increasing the asymmetries and also the demand for 
international hierarchies. Second, the question is whether there is a clear link between 
investment expansion and governmental policies. Once again, in case of Russian investments 
in Ukraine businesses basically ignore the regionalism dimension. However, given a 
relatively high influence of consolidated political leadership in Kazakhstan on its business 
groups, one could in fact expect that the government will be able to influence the investment 
decisions following the logic of international politics. Hence, one can actually expect that in 
case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic regionalization could support formal regionalism.11 
The main question is to certain extend: can Kazakhstan win where Russia (also using informal 
regionalization as an instrument of control for the first half of the 2000s) lost?   
Obviously, the scope of these projects mostly covers Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz 
Republic, and maybe Tajikistan (where the position of Russia is crucial). Uzbekistan has been 
quite reluctant to support regionalism in Central Asia (Bohr, 2004; Kuz’min, 2008), and in the 
current situation seems to prefer Russia to Kazakhstan as the main source of FDI, designing 
its investment policies respectively (Abalkina et al., 2007). The latter fact raises an important 
issue of competition between Central Asian regionalism projects and broader projects (with 
participation of Russia – EAEC – or China – Shanghai Cooperation Organization). And in 
this context development of regionalization can also be quite important: on the one hand, 
strong economic interconnections can make regional integration within Central Asia a 
priority; but on the other hand, it is possible, that at least some actors try to off-balance 
economic influence of Kazakhstan by the political influence of other actors (e.g. Russia). 
Theoretically, it is also reasonable to claim that the development of Central Asian regionalism 
is able to reinforce the regionalization, reducing the degree of political uncertainty and 
removing existing borders. The crucial factor is here whether the regionalism will move from 
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 It is important to notice, that the main players in the economy of Kazakhstan are, though highly connected to 
the government, still private businesses. There is no trend towards wide-scope nationalization in Kazakhstan, as 
it was observed in Russia. This is an additional argument in favor of the regionalism projects: in case of 
dominance of state-owned enterprises regionalization can effectively become just another form of 
intergovernmental contacts, making any form of further cooperation meaningless (Vinokurov, 2007a). 
rhetoric to implementation. The effects of pure rhetoric (as it has been so far in the field of 
regionalism in Central Asia) are ambiguous: it can both create necessary framework for 
public support of investment expansion (what seems to be the case for Kazakhstan-Kyrgyz 
Republic dyad (Kuz’min, 2008)), but also introduce political tensions in purely economic 
relations. 
From the point of view of informal trade one can hardly expect any clear effects of 
regionalization on regionalism and vice versa. Informal trade supports the persistence of 
social integration and cross-border interpersonal networks, necessary for any integration 
project. On the other hand, increasing intergovernmental cooperation could theoretically shift 
the patterns of informal trade to formal trade by creating well-protected property rights and 
restricting rent-seeking of public officials through removing additional options for their 
decision-making (it is actually implied by any economic liberalization). From this point of 
view the very existence of informal trade is based on the lack of formal framework for 
cooperation – once again, very similar to the issue of the informal economy in general. 
Whether this degree of cooperation (and of quality of governance in general) can be achieved, 
is questionable. A reasonable point often mentioned by sociologists is that the real puzzle is 
not why some people prefer informal structures, but why there are people choosing the 
formalization of their transactions (Paneyakh, 2008). In a region with decades-old traditions 
of informal economy (in fact, flourishing even under late Soviet regime) even changes of 
formal institutions may have no effect on behavioral patterns for the actors. 
 
5.3. Decentralization and integration 
 The final aspect to be considered is the interaction between decentralization and 
regional economic integration. Does the existence of informal trade and development of FDI 
flows in Central Asia support or prevent formal (or informal) decentralization? And how does 
the informal decentralization (if present) influence the integration? Basically, the interaction 
between decentralization and regional integration should be considered from two points of 
view. On the one hand, from the point of view of the demand for decentralization, regional 
integration reduces the costs of autonomy and hence acts as a trigger for stronger 
decentralization. Unsurprisingly, political decentralization and economic integration are 
interrelated (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). On the other hand, regional integration reduces the 
desire of central government to provide decentralization (supply side): the rents from the 
regions increase, and the threat of secession also goes up. China, as mentioned, may be a good 
example of these policies, though the opposite view is also present (Zheng, 2006). The 
outcome may depend on the relative bargaining potential of both sides. In the countries 
experiencing stronger centralization (like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) the supply-side motive 
may become predominant (one may talk about “supply-driven markets for decentralization”). 
From this point of view development of informal cross-border linkages just creates an 
additional argument for central governments to restrict decentralization. On the other hand, 
countries with weak central government may experience stronger devolution. It may be 
especially applicable for Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, in Central Asia the concerns for 
territorial integrity are present in the political agenda of most countries: the borders between 
them are weak at best (Olcott and Malashenko, 2000) and often artificially set by the Soviet 
“nation delimination” – and to a certain extend “nation creation” politics (Farrant, 2006). This 
is yet additional argument for central governments to support centralization in a world of 
informal integration.  
 On the other hand, it is possible to claim that the increasing (or constantly high) 
centralization of political authority in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan may become a 
factor limiting the development of regional integration. In a non- or semi-authoritarian 
political system central elites are unlikely to restrict their power in form of international 
agreements, if possible (therefore the ability of non-democracies to establish formal 
integration is very limited, if there are no strong power asymmetries). Centralization of the 
spatial order of authority in these countries means as well increasing concentration of political 
power – which, in turns, makes the existence of international cooperation less likely. There 
seems to be a paradoxical connection between increasing centralization in individual countries 
and “centralization” (i.e. delegation of authorities through international cooperation) at the 
international level.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 In spite of the widely recognized need for cross-border cooperation in Central Asia, 
the last fifteen years provided evidence for extremely low degree of top-down regionalism. 
Although integration rhetoric has been used quite often (especially in Kazakhstan), there is no 
sign of any more or less important integration achievements. Most countries prefer designing 
their policy unilaterally, leading to numerous conflicts, especially in the field of common pool 
resources (like water or energy). Similarly, the issue of decentralization remains a permanent 
topic of discussion in the expert of political community, followed by extremely limited 
political measures. That is why it is interesting to look at yet another dimension of regional 
integration and decentralization, taking informal relations between governments and activity 
of non-governmental agents into account. From this perspective, different insights are 
possible. 
 Although all Central Asian countries are formally highly centralized, some of them 
experienced a period of significant de-facto decentralization in the 1990s, followed by the re-
centralization in the 2000s. Kazakhstan seems to be the most prominent example of this trend. 
Moreover, regional political identities play an important role in both politics and bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to improve the quality of public administration by decentralization 
and devolution in the region seems to be unsuccessful. The very informal nature of 
decentralization makes its effects questionable. Moreover, a typical feature of semi-
authoritarian regimes is institutional pesudomorphism: institutions are likely to have a 
completely different function than officially declared. In this case governments are able to 
guarantee their power even without resolving to coercion. The example of the Mahalla 
Initiative in Uzbekistan demonstrates that it may be true for institutions of decentralization, 
which in fact can become a “hidden channel” of expansion of state influence. Moreover, the 
very presence of informal decentralization as an option seems to limit the development of 
formal decentralization; the development pattern of internal decentralization has a negative 
impact on the international cooperation in the region. 
Analogously, regionalization seems to play an important role in the Central Asian 
region. Basically, it takes two forms. First, countries of the region seem to be interconnected 
by the networks of informal trade, based on the long-term past experience. Second, recent 
economic success of Kazakhstan has allowed this country to become an important center for 
development of regional multinationals and FDI, particularly important for Kyrgyz Republic, 
as well as act as a center of attraction for labor migration. The patterns of regionalization 
seem to be heavily influenced by the development of institutions in Central Asian countries. 
In particular, the model of more liberal reforms combined with still-persistent links between 
influential business groups and politics seems to be a “success combination” for the 
multinationals from Kazakhstan (as opposed to Uzbekistan). The impact of regionalization on 
institutional development is, however, ambiguous: on the one hand, it can serve as a link for 
transmission of “best practices” and reinforce better property rights, but on the other hand, the 
positive impact is limited by institutional deficits for the economy of Kazakhstan.  Finally, in 
Central Asia regionalization could potentially support the regionalism development, though 
the expectations are also unclear. 
 Since we are dealing with a relatively recent process, it is difficult to make clear 
predictions regarding the future of the regionalization in Central Asia. Probably, there is no 
reason to expect any decline of cross-border informal trade, given lack of reforms in poor 
quality of governance in most countries of the region. It is the economic prosperity and 
freedom which could effectively shift the patterns of trade to the formal sector – but there is 
no reason to expect these changes. On the other hand, the development of other forms of 
regionalization – FDI expansion from Kazakhstan and increasing labor migration to this 
country – crucially depends on economic performance of Kazakhstan. Recent turbulences 
related to the global financial crisis, which seem to have a significant impact on the banking 
system of Kazakhstan (the driving force of FDI regionalization!), raise some questions 
regarding the viability of the model. Therefore the coming few years could be quite 
interesting from the point of view of informal regional integration in Central Asia. 
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Appendix: Interjurisdictional Competition and Demand for Institutions 
In what follows I will sketch several arguments explaining the potential impact of the interjurisdictional 
competition on the quality of institutions in presence of demand for bad institutions. First I assume the demand 
for bad institutions as given, and demonstrate its impact on the results of institutional completion. Second, I 
examine the factors underlying the demand for bad institutions in an economy and check their changes in an 
environment of institutional competition. 
There are two main explanations for the effects of the interjurisdictional competition. First, institutional 
competition increases of power of mobile corporations and individuals (Beck (2002) calls it “exit power”), as 
“exit” or a threat of “exit” is an additional instrument to influence the economic policy. That means, that the 
resulting institutions surviving in the institutional competition will be more adequate to demand (see, e.g. 
Vanberg (2000)). If individuals and corporations prefer low-quality institutions, they will have a better 
opportunity to enforce it under the institutional competition, e.g., they can “punish” a government introducing 
better institutions, or, in turn, support a jurisdiction with a lower quality of institutions by investing into its 
economy. That is why the jurisdictions with low quality of institutions do not require making any changes. 
The preference for low quality institutions, as mentioned above, can be based on asset stripping. That is 
why a possibility to export capital abroad is even an additional factor supporting demand for “bad” institutions. 
An inefficient equilibrium resulting from the open economy includes asset striping, large capital flight (or “exit”) 
and low quality of institutions. The same individuals, who use the “exit” option to secure their wealth gained 
from assets in the jurisdictional with law quality of institutions, support with their “voice” option the “bad” 
institutions (see Mummert and Mummert, 2000).  
Second, the “exit” of efficient companies can strengthen the “voice” of inefficient companies. After 
most efficient companies leave the country, the remaining inefficient ones become the main income source for 
politicians and bureaucrats (legally and illegally) and get a larger impact on the politic decisions. This effect 
exists, if, for example, two jurisdictions with “bad” institutions and “bad” reputation of the government and with 
“good” institutions and “good” reputation compete.  
 Moreover, the institutional competition is only one of the instruments controlling the government’s 
behaviour, as the political competition among countries can be an additional argument to improve quality of 
institutions as well. The governments seek not only rents, but also try to get more power in international 
relations. Especially the European experience shows, that the political competition can be a factor fostering 
economic growth and supporting the innovations in institutional systems (Leipold, 1997). Due to higher 
interdependence of national economies the political competition increases in an open economy and the economic 
component of the national power in world politics becomes more important. However, even if the government is 
be interested in institutional innovations, the existence of demand for “bad” institutions can become a factor 
preventing necessary institutional change and supporting lock-ins. 
 The discussed analysis is static, as it takes demand for “bad” institutions for granted. But the free 
mobility of factors between jurisdictions can induce changes not only on the supply side of the market for 
institutions, but also on the demand side. These changes are outlined in what follows 
I start with the first reason for demand for inefficient institutions (the redistribution possibilities). 
Obviously the redistribution rents depend upon the general productivity of a jurisdiction (like the distribution of 
a pie depends upon the size of the pie). If the gross product of the jurisdiction declines, the rents go down, and it 
changes the preference for “bad” institutions. As there is only a limited number of agents receiving redistribution 
rents, the other actors can chose “exit” with the resulting decrease of production.  
 If the exit costs are lower for richer actors, the second effect of the interjurisdictional competition 
described above (“sorting” individuals under jurisdictions by their preferences) does not function. However, the 
first effect (the exit power) becomes even stronger, as only individuals with preferences for “bad” institutions 
can use “exit” to enforce their will. The assumption that the product of the jurisdiction depends upon the number 
of its citizen is also partly unrealistic. The main production factor may be not labour, but capital, and, as already 
noticed, the capital is redistributed unequally. To sum up, the higher the inequality, the lower positive effects of 
interjurisdictional competition. 
The second factor changing the demand side behaviour is the increasing economic competition resulting 
from the interdependence of markets. The environment for institutional competition implies not only free cross-
border capital flows, but also free flows of goods. Since the competitiveness of national companies depends 
upon the quality of institutions in their home country, to improve their competitiveness, they will vote in favour 
of better institutions and a kind of indirect competition among institutions arises (Kerber and Budzinski, 2004). 
This competition is different to the “direct” competition among jurisdictions, as the reference criterion is not the 
preferences of the demand side, but the success in international competition.  
A factor weakening the logics of this “competition among institutions via competition among 
companies” is the presence of additional competition advantages in the country with weaker institutions. An 
example of these additional competition advantages is a (quasi) monopolistic position on a market of 
commodities, like oil or metals. This factor doesn’t stand forever, especially because of scientific and technical 
progress, but in a short and even middle term companies can soften the negative competition effects. They 
compare the losses from low competitiveness with losses in form of lost rents and additional costs for learning 
new institutions and decide, whether they support institutional changes or not.  
Third, as the demand for bad institutions sometimes results from information asymmetry, learning 
effects are to be considered. The theoretical background for the discussion is concept of yardstick competition. 
Information about the quality of institutions and outcomes of policies in other jurisdictions is relevant for 
individuals’ decisions to support or to reject a similar institution in their own jurisdiction. Individuals can learn 
from experience of other jurisdictions. But if individuals do not trust their government, they will believe to be 
swindled even if the government (or other politicians in the political process) offers better institutions, especially 
because of impossibility of the direct and complete import of institutions as the political situation may differ and 
the presence of non-expected and indirect effects of institutions incorporated in different systems of rules.  
Summarizing the main points, the interjurisdictional competition can influence the demand side and 
reduce the demand for bad institutions. But the high inequality, presence of unique competition factors like 
natural resources and low trust make the interjurisdictional competition less efficient. 
 
